The Chinese 'Middle Man' in The Russia-Ukraine Crisis

The commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Ukrainian relations in 2021 coincided with important events such as the first telephone call of the leaders, the signing of an intergovernmental agreement between China and Ukraine to deepen construction cooperation, the 'One Road, One Belt' initiative, intergovernmental cooperation committee, increase in the number of Chinese companies in Ukraine, and the exchange of international students occurred between the two sides.

In this regard, the bilateral emphasis on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the policy of a single China, and considering China as Ukraine's largest trading partner (with a bilateral trade volume of $ 19 billion in 2021) were important parts of the scope of cooperation.

On the other hand, the continuation of extensive geopolitical, political, economic, and military ties between Russia and China with a comprehensive strategic partnership, bilateral trade of $147 billion, and the growth of military and technological relations in 2021 were the goals of the two countries.

In fact, the joint statement of China and Russia on international relations and sustainable global development in the new era on February 4, 2022, in addition to emphasizing the unrestricted friendship between the two countries, criticized NATO's eastward expansion, the AUKUS tripartite security agreement and the Quartet Security Dialogue (between Australia, India, Japan, and the US).

China's approach to the Ukraine crisis

After the Beijing Winter Olympics, Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine. China did not even begin evacuating its citizens from Ukraine, but since the early days of the Ukraine crisis, Beijing paid attention to contacts by foreign ministers, and phone conversations between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

On the other hand, the telephone calls between Chinese and Ukrainian officials, China's emphasis on civilian casualties, the six-point proposal to the UN Security Council, emergency humanitarian aid, emphasis on responsible behavior and partnership with Ukraine were other parts of China's balanced policy toward the Ukraine crisis. However, more than a 100 days after the Ukraine debacle, the crisis remains a major challenge to China's foreign policy. Also, given China's position in world politics and economics, its approach to the Ukraine war is important.

In fact, in recent months, China has presented a special narrative of the Ukraine crisis. This approach began with the West's role in the crisis, NATO expansion, ignoring Russia's security concerns, and describing the Russian invasion as a 'special military action'. But following the prolongation of the war and revealing the serious consequences of the crisis on the economy, Russia's military weaknesses, greater US-allied coordination, and the highlighting of the Russian threat, China's approach to Ukraine became more cautious. In this regard, China seems to be trying to emphasize the negotiation solution by presenting the image of a responsible actor, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and Russia's security concerns.

Also, the characteristics and signs of 'pragmatism' in China's foreign policy became more apparent with the Chinese ambassador to Washington emphasizing the principle of neutrality, Beijing's emphasis that the Ukraine crisis is regional, China's independent decisions, and ignorance of Russian military actions.

In this regard, Beijing even tries to mention points such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not profitable for China, admiring the unity of the Ukrainian people and paying attention to the negative consequences of the Russian attack on advancing China's 'One Road, One Belt' project in Ukraine. Indeed, although China's capacity for mediation is very limited, mediation and immediate and peaceful resolution of the crisis seems to be a very important priority for Beijing.

China's current and neutral view of the Ukraine crisis

Protecting Economic Interests and Avoiding Economic Sanctions: China's economic interests play an important role in its approach to the Ukraine crisis. The crisis is restricting economic relations between China and Ukraine. China is also the center of world production, the world's largest export market, the world's largest creditor, which holds 18 percent of the world's GDP, much more integrated into the world economy than Russia.

In recent months, however, Beijing has opposed any unilateral sanctions, calling them "financial nuclear bombs", "big clubs", "financial terrorism" and "economic weapons" against Russia. But in practice, China's basic support for Russia in countering sanctions has been negligible, and Beijing has withdrawn its companies from Russia or has limited or suspended their activities. In the meantime, given the previous threat from US President Joe Biden, if Beijing provides material support to Russia, there will be consequences.

China practically does not want to lose its broad economic interests in relations with the United States, the European Union, the One Road, the One Belt project, and world trade.

The long Moscow-Kyiv war also causes economic instability and greater damage to China, a sharp rise in energy and food prices, and so on. In addition, Beijing fears that Russia's economic sanctions could serve as a model against China. Therefore, it has taken a more cautious and pragmatic approach.

Reducing geopolitical and security threats and gaining new opportunities: Russia seems to want China's wider support in the Ukraine crisis. But Beijing is now looking to reduce geopolitical threats and even seize new opportunities. In fact, many of the previous achievements of the cooperation could be jeopardized if Beijing completely distances itself from Moscow. Therefore, Russia's complete defeat is dangerous for China. also, the concern of Russia from NATO expansion in the East is palpable.

On the other hand, China does not support Russia's policy of secession of eastern Ukraine, as it runs counter to China's policies in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

In addition, as the conflict in Ukraine continues, international pressure on China to choose between Moscow and the West is increasing. The United States, however, has not paid attention to China's systematic effort to help Russia or provide any significant military support to Moscow, but as the crisis continues, maintaining a military and political relationship with Russia will certainly be criticized by the West.

On the other hand, China does not want the war in Ukraine to have a large-scale negative impact on its interests in Taiwan and Asia.

Meanwhile, China does not agree with the expansion of Taiwan-Ukraine relations, Western and US diplomatic and military activities, and wider assistance to Taiwan.

Also, issues such as global NATO and its expansion into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the formation of a strategic environment around Beijing, further US-India-Japan military convergence against China, and the proximity of Southeast Asian states to the West, could lead to political, economic, and even military support for Taiwan.

China, meanwhile, cannot be indifferent to Western pressure for more Beijing measures to contain Moscow. Because of China's neutrality, if it does not lead to the preservation of China's security and national interests, will actually lead to more geopolitical and security threats.

Vision

Although China still seems to be paying attention to Russia's legitimate security concerns over NATO expansion, establishing a security guarantee mechanism, and China's presence as a guarantor at the Beijing table, but Beijing's concerns about the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the risk of chemical and biological warfare, or even a tactical nuclear attack, have increased. China has succeeded in ensuring the security of Chinese citizens and evacuating them from Ukraine, but the prospect of escalating conflict in the Ukraine crisis is worrying.

In this regard, Beijing is trying to show that it is in close contact with all parties and is not happy with the crisis, and does not see it as a strategic opportunity. In addition, doesn't want Sino-Russian relations to be a tool for targeting a third party and seeks to work with the United States to prevent the cooling of the relations and to resolve the Ukraine crisis.

On the other hand, it seems that the escalation of the Ukraine crisis will lead to more liberal-extremist disagreements among the Chinese authorities over Ukraine. It will also be more difficult to maintain the China-Russia partnership while maintaining relations with the West as the war continues.

It is clear that in the future, China's main strategy is to minimize the threats posed by the Ukraine crisis to China and prioritize the economy and ensure China's full presence in the world economy. But maintaining the neutrality strategy of China will become more difficult as the war in Ukraine escalates. It may even consider reducing military-security relations with Russia amid pressure and choosing between Moscow or the West. However, China will support and welcome any efforts to resolve the Ukraine conflict quickly to reduce the scope of the widespread threats and to pursue a variety of interest.