Dr. Gil Feiler
Since their announcement in 2020, the Abraham Accords have reshaped the diplomatic architecture of the Middle East. Initially formalizing normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, the accords marked a departure from the long-standing Arab consensus that normalization should follow resolution of the Palestinian issue. Central to discussions of the accords’ expansion is Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). As the Kingdom’s de facto ruler, MbS faces a complex strategic calculus regarding whether—and under what conditions—to formally join.
Saudi Arabia’s potential accession reflects intertwined geostrategic, economic, domestic, and reputational considerations. A comparative analysis with the UAE, the first Gulf state to normalize, illuminates the distinct strategic cultures shaping Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s approaches.
Strategic and Security Calculations
For Riyadh, normalization with Israel is closely tied to regional security architecture. Saudi Arabia and Iran remain strategic competitors across multiple arenas. Formal engagement with Israel could institutionalize intelligence sharing, enhance missile defense coordination, and deepen technological cooperation against shared threats. From MbS’s perspective, such alignment would consolidate deterrence while embedding Saudi Arabia within a broader, partly U.S.-backed regional coalition.
However, Saudi Arabia’s security doctrine differs from that of the UAE. Abu Dhabi, under the leadership of bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has historically pursued a proactive and interventionist regional policy, evident in Libya, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. The UAE framed normalization as a strategic hedge against Iran and political Islam while simultaneously positioning itself as a pragmatic, forward-looking actor.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia’s scale, religious legitimacy, and custodianship of Islam’s holy sites create higher reputational stakes. Riyadh must weigh not only deterrence gains but also the symbolic implications for its leadership role in the Muslim world. While both states share concerns about Iran, Saudi Arabia’s larger population and religious establishment generate more complex domestic constraints.
Economic Modernization: Vision 2030 vs. Emirati Diversification
Economic incentives are central to MbS’s calculus. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify beyond hydrocarbons, expand tourism, and foster advanced industries. Israeli strengths in cybersecurity, agri-tech, water management, and artificial intelligence could directly complement Saudi diversification goals. Normalization could accelerate joint ventures, venture capital flows, and technology transfers.
The UAE’s strategy offers a revealing contrast. By 2020, the Emirati economy was already diversified, globally integrated, and oriented toward services, logistics, and finance. Normalization thus reinforced existing trajectories rather than transforming structural foundations. Emirati–Israeli trade and investment flows grew rapidly because institutional frameworks, regulatory openness, and social tolerance were already established.
Saudi Arabia, by comparison, is undergoing systemic transformation. While the potential gains from normalization may be larger in absolute terms, the absorptive capacity of the Saudi private sector and regulatory environment remains in transition. MbS must therefore consider sequencing: whether domestic reforms should mature further before formal normalization amplifies external exposure.
Domestic Legitimacy and the Palestinian Question
The Palestinian issue constitutes a critical variable. Although Gulf public opinion has evolved, the Palestinian cause remains symbolically potent. For the UAE, normalization was framed as preventing annexation of West Bank territories, providing diplomatic cover. Moreover, the UAE’s smaller citizen population and centralized political structure limited organized opposition.
Saudi Arabia’s situation is more delicate. As the birthplace of Islam and home to Mecca and Medina, the Kingdom’s decisions carry religious and ideological resonance beyond its borders. MbS has gradually moderated official rhetoric, but Riyadh has not abandoned the Arab Peace Initiative framework. Joining the Abraham Accords without tangible concessions for Palestinians could undermine Saudi claims to regional moral leadership.
Leadership Rivalry and Regional Hierarchy
Another dimension is intra-Gulf competition. The UAE’s early normalization elevated Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic standing and strengthened its ties with Washington. Saudi Arabia, as the region’s largest economy and political heavyweight, may be reluctant to appear as following the Emirati lead. Riyadh traditionally prefers shaping regional consensus rather than endorsing initiatives launched by smaller states.
At the same time, normalization could reassert Saudi primacy if structured as a grand bargain involving U.S. security guarantees or civil nuclear cooperation. In such a scenario, Riyadh would frame accession not as imitation but as strategic culmination.
The Role of the United States
The United States has consistently encouraged Saudi normalization, viewing it as consolidating a pro-Western regional bloc. Yet Washington’s leverage is complex. Security cooperation, arms transfers, and diplomatic backing provide inducements, but overt coercion risks backlash and accusations of undermining Saudi sovereignty.
Compared to the UAE, which has cultivated a close bipartisan relationship in Washington, Saudi–U.S. ties have experienced periods of strain. U.S. pressure is therefore more calibrated, often embedded within broader negotiations over defense commitments and technological cooperation. MbS, conscious of strategic autonomy, seeks tangible security guarantees in exchange for transformative diplomatic steps.
Conclusion: Divergent Paths within Convergent Interests
A comparative analysis reveals both convergence and divergence between Saudi and Emirati strategies. Both perceive benefits in aligning more openly with Israel, particularly in countering Iran and advancing technological modernization. However, the UAE acted from a position of economic diversification and political insulation, enabling swift normalization.
Saudi Arabia’s decision matrix is more layered. MbS must integrate security benefits, economic modernization, domestic legitimacy, religious symbolism, and regional hierarchy. The potential gains are substantial: enhanced deterrence, accelerated innovation, and strengthened ties with Western partners. The risks—domestic backlash, reputational erosion, and strategic overdependence—are equally significant.
Ultimately, Saudi accession to the Abraham Accords will hinge on whether MbS can transform normalization from a diplomatic gesture into a comprehensive strategic package that reinforces, rather than dilutes, Saudi Arabia’s regional leadership.
